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Abstract. The skies as sites of protest are opening up. Protester-operated drones are beginning to appear in
the skies above protests: watching the watchmen, installing an additional layer of surveillance, increasing ac-
countability and self-discipline amongst the police. In this way protester drones could be seen as establishing a
“protester panopticon”, with the police as subjects. This article explores the potential panoptic effect of the gaze
upon the police, drawing on sousveillance theory, before using counter-surveillance as a way to explore potential
options for police resistance to the gaze of the protester drone. These resistive efforts are broken down into four
categories, legislation and regulation, obscuring the gaze, electronic countermeasures and kinetic and physical
force.
1 Introduction
The protest has long been the site of changing power re-
lations, with protester adoption of new technologies, such
as cameras, mobile phones and social media, all prompt-
ing reaction and resistance from the police (Bradshaw, 2013;
O’Rourke, 2011; Neumayer and Stald, 2014). This article
takes this contestation of power from the terrestrial dimen-
sion and lifts it to the aerial, exploring not the traditional po-
lice utilisation of the aerial but the protester adoption of the
aerial domain for surveillance of the police through the use
of drones. As such, the article offers an account of the po-
tential regulatory impact of aerial surveillance upon British
and American police forces and the resulting emerging and
potential adaptive attempts at resistance. In doing so, the ar-
ticle is framed by the theoretical work of Foucault (1991,
2002, 2004), and his engagement with Jeremy Bentham’s
panopticon; the architectural mechanism of power designed
to internalise self-regulation amongst its occupants. Criti-
cally, however, the article proposes that the use of drones by
protesters constructs a panopticon, in which the police are
the subject. In constructing this “protester panopticon”, the
article draws inspiration from work on counter-surveillance
and sousveillance, by authors such as Monahan (2006), Wil-
son and Serisier (2010) and Mann et al. (2003), but critically
applies it to the police-resisting surveillance by protesters
rather than protesters resisting surveillance by the police.
While there are discussions and debates over the continuing
relevance of Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s panopticon to
modern technology and society (Lyon, 1994; Boyne, 2000;
Yar, 2002; Wood, 2007), this article opts to use the panop-
ticon as a tool to facilitate exploration of self-regulation,
visibility, power and accountability of police forces, while
recognising its limitations. In doing so it highlights Lyon’s
(2007:61) stance that “[t]he panoptic idea still has some mer-
its for surveillance theory in that ... the uncertainty of being
watched may still act as a deterrent to deviance”.
In the process of exploring the changing power relations
between protesters and the police brought on by the introduc-
tion of drones and the establishment of an aerial “protester
panopticon”, the article seeks to heed the call of academics
such as Elden (2013) to consider territory volumetrically
rather than merely focusing on the terrestrial or aerial plain,
for as Crampton (2010:96) also reminds us, “territory is
not just horizontal.” The article approaches the protest as a
volume, with power operating across multiple dimensions.
Rather than solely examining the impact of the aerial gaze
on the terrestrial, the article also explores the way in which
terrestrial police resistance can impact upon the aerial di-
mension through a range of methods, including the elec-
tronic spectrum and radio waves. The aerial dimension of
the protest volume offers a unique perspective, which his-
Published by Copernicus Publications for the Geographisch-Ethnographische Gesellschaft Zürich & Association Suisse de Géographie.
100 N. J. Waghorn et al.: Resisting drones and the “protester panopticon”
torically has been reserved for police and the media but is
now beginning to open up due to the increasing commercial
availability of drones, thereby broadening opportunities for
aerial surveillance. In this way, civilian drones are adding to
what Thompson (2005) described as the “new visibility”, the
uncontrollable rendering of the invisible visible, and could
therefore be an answer to the age-old question, “quis cus-
todiet ipsos custodes?” (Who will guard the guards them-
selves, often interpreted as who watches the watchmen?)
While there has been academic work on the adoption of
drones by police for surveillance (Clarke, 2014) and the sub-
sequent implications for civil liberties and privacy (Finn and
Wright, 2012; Jenkins, 2013), the reversal of this arrange-
ment, the ability of drones to watch the police, remains un-
developed. In order to develop this subject area, the arti-
cle engages critically with a range of surveillance, counter-
surveillance and sousveillance literatures, particularly Lyon
(1994, 2007), Marx (2003, 2009) and Mann and Ferenbok
(2013), to examine the potential impacts of the “protester
panopticon” and theorise police attempts to resist. The the-
ory is supplemented with a range of primary sources, no-
tably House of Lords and House of Commons testimonies
and reports and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) documents. Addition-
ally, due to the current dearth of academic literature for this
new field of study, the article draws upon a range of British
and American media sources to highlight recent technolog-
ical advancements and contemporary examples of efforts to
resist the gaze and restrict the presence of drones in the skies.
As the rules and regulations that govern the use of drones
are still evolving, so are the official responses to the tech-
nology. The resistive element of these responses, however, is
currently limited, with the official guidance from the British
National Police Chiefs’ Council (2015:8), for example, pri-
marily being to wait for the batteries of the drone to run out.
Official insights into more active efforts at resisting drones
are, however, also limited. When testifying to a House of
Lords investigation into the civilian use of drones in the Eu-
ropean Union, for example, sections of the evidence pro-
vided to the investigation by the European Unmanned Sys-
tems Centre (EuroUSC), the National Air Traffic Services
(NATS) and the CAA were heard behind closed doors (Clot
et al., 2014:52). As such there is a current silence surround-
ing official insights into the active official active resistance of
drones, meaning that police responses are speculative within
this article and based on police responses to similar surveil-
lance technologies, such as cameras, or on responses which
have been proven to neutralise drone technology, albeit out-
side a protest setting. In time, once the police have had to
resist the gaze of drones on a more regular basis, the police
responses to drones may become more transparent, and more
work in this area should be undertaken.
The article consists of two parts. Firstly, it explores the
work of Foucault (1991) on the panopticon, proposing that
the protester adoption of drones could be conceived as con-
structing a “protester panopticon”, designed to hold the po-
lice to account and induce self-discipline. Having introduced
the potentially panoptic effects of protester-operated drones
at protests, the article then draws on counter-surveillance as
a way to explore ways for the police to resist the gaze of
the drone. This second half systematically breaks these resis-
tive efforts into sections including legislative and regulatory,
obscuration of identities, electronic countermeasures and ki-
netic and physical force.
At this point a clarification and caveat are needed. The ter-
minology surrounding drones is contested, with more techni-
cal terms and acronyms, such as remotely piloted aircraft sys-
tem (RPAS), unmanned aerial system (UAS) and unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV), arguably better reflecting the sophis-
ticated level of the technology and the inclusion of a hu-
man in the loop. Despite the unpopularity of the term drone
with the military and parts of industry (Boucher, 2014), this
article uses the term due to its saturation within the me-
dia and the public. The Conservative MP Robert Goodwill
(2015), for example, highlights that “while we may endeav-
our to keep everybody calling these things RPAS, ‘drone’ is
the word that has now come into common parlance”, with
the then Chair, now Honorary President, of the All Party
Parliamentary Group on Drones, Labour MP Tom Watson
(2013), observing that the term drone is “more accessible
than some of the more technical terms”. On a technical level
it is also important to establish that when this article talks
about protester- and media-operated drones it is referring to
small rotary aircraft, such as the popular DJI Phantom and
Parrot AR quadcopters, as opposed to large fixed wing mod-
els, such as Predators and Reapers being used in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Yemen.
2 Surveillance
Surveillance is, at its core, about power. As Lyon (2007:23)
highlights, “[w]hatever the purpose of surveillance, to influ-
ence, manage, protect or direct, some form of power rela-
tions are involved.” The utilisation of drones by protesters to
watch the police and to conduct surveillance should be seen
as a clear intention to exercise power in order to modify the
behaviour of the police. In order to unpack this attempt to
exercise power, this article draws upon Foucault (1994:329),
who observed that “in order to understand what power rela-
tions are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of
resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations”.
While power relations between protesters and police at the
terrestrial level of the protest have been unpacked by aca-
demics such as Goldsmith (2010) and Bradshaw (2013), for
instance, this article builds upon this work by adding the
aerial dimension to the protest volume.
Discussion on surveillance, Lyon (1994:161) cautions, of-
ten “quickly relapses into the paranoid, where surveillance
is viewed overwhelmingly and monolithically as a threat”.
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Accordingly it is prudent to stress that this article does not
seek to claim that the addition of drones and the aerial per-
spective to the protester arsenal creates an all-encompassing,
unescapable cage of surveillance; instead it seeks to explore
and stimulate discussions over the ways in which the police
can resist or mitigate the gaze of drones. Due to the increased
availability of the technology, the presence of drones in the
skies is likely to continue to expand and the police will de-
velop ways to respond and resist, as they have done with
the advent of previous technologies, such as video cameras,
smartphones and social media. Before exploring these op-
tions for the resistance of drones, let us briefly examine the
potential effects of the aerial gaze of the drone upon police.
3 Protester panopticon
When envisioning a drone hovering above police at a protest,
recording, transmitting and surveilling the police, clear paral-
lels can be drawn with Foucault’s work on Bentham’s panop-
ticon. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1991) describes
an architectural machine of power where a prisoner is sit-
uated in a backlit cell arranged so that the prisoner cannot
see into other cells, instead facing only a central tower that
the prisoner cannot see into but must assume that there is a
guard watching from at all times. This arrangement has the
effect of rendering the prisoner “perfectly individualised and
constantly visible” (Foucault, 1991:200). The un-verifiability
of the guard’s attention, that constant potential gaze of the
guard, impacts the behaviour of the prisoner, for as Foucault
explains, “[he] who is subjected to a field of visibility, and
who knows it, assumes responsibility upon himself; he in-
scribes in himself the power relation in which he simultane-
ously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own
subjection” (1991:202–3). The prisoner knows that they are
potentially being watched at all times and therefore does not
engage in activity that would lead to potential punishment,
despite not knowing that someone is necessarily watching at
that particular moment. They internalise the self-discipline.
This paper suggests that the presence of drones in the
skies above protests could be seen as constructing an aerial
“protester panopticon”. The continuous potential presence of
the protester drone in the skies, at heights from which their
presence or gaze in unverifiable, should be seen as an aerial
architecture of control. This continuous, unblinking, unveri-
fiable gaze created a metaphorical prison cell in which each
individual member of the police can be identified and their
actions scrutinised, leading potentially to punishment if war-
ranted. In this way protester-operated drones may establish a
panoptic effect on the police below; that is to say that they
may “induce in the inmate [the police officer] a state of con-
scious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power” (Foucault, 1991:201). The police will
self-regulate their own behaviour to ensure that they do not
do anything that could warrant punishment, as they know
that the “protester panopticon” could potentially always be
watching their actions, ready to hold them to account.
4 Sousveillance
This construction of a theoretical “protester panopticon” and
watching of the police, as the police themselves surveil
the protesters, is protesters engaging in what Mann et al.
(2003: 322) call “sousveillance”: literally, to watch from be-
low – the surveilled watching the surveillors. The objec-
tive of sousveillance is to highlight practices of surveillance
and challenge their use and provoke discussion. “Acts of
sousveillance”, Mann et al. highlight, “redirect an establish-
ment’s mechanisms and technologies of surveillance back
on the establishment” (Mann et al., 2003:347). Traditional
sousveillance has taken the form of photography and video-
ing from ground level, using technology also used by the
state, due to the growing use of drones by British and US po-
lice forces to conduct surveillance (Wall and Monahan, 2011;
Graham, 2011), however, sousveillance by drone is a logical
reflexive step; with protesters adopting the same technologies
of surveillance as the state. If police have objections about
the protester use of drones to watch them, then their concerns
may trigger discussions about the growing use of drones by
police forces themselves, potentially tempering their adop-
tion of increasing protections from excessive surveillance.
Sousveillance also increases the potential for accountabil-
ity, due to the capturing of another perspective of an inci-
dent – a recording which is, crucially, independent from the
authority being held to account. This additional perspective
may shed light on cases of abuse in situations where offi-
cial footage has been “lost” or is claimed to be non-existent.
In the case of the investigation into the police assault of Ian
Tomlinson, and his resulting death, during the G20 protests in
London in 2009, for example, the “IPCC [Independent Police
Complaints Committee] had initially claimed that there were
no CCTV cameras near the assault. However, on 14 April,
the London Evening Standard identified several cameras in
the immediate area” (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010:1052).
Official technologies of surveillance, such as CCTV, cannot
necessarily be relied upon to hold the police to account for
their actions. Kearon (2012:418), for example, highlights that
“[f]rom the beating of Rodney King to the death of Ian Tom-
linson, images that have triggered significant and highly visi-
ble public criticism of criminal justice agencies have not rou-
tinely been generated by formal technologies and networks
of surveillance, but by technologies of informal surveillance
utilised by members of the public”. Protester-operated drones
therefore add another tool to the sousveillance toolkit and al-
low aerial access to previously inaccessible areas, such as
behind police front lines.
The police, however, will not be the only prisoners caught
in the “protester panopticon”, that aerial mechanism of power
for instilling self-discipline. Protesters will also be caught by
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the gaze, illuminated and individualised as though they too
were in a cell. The panoptic gaze of protester drones is there-
fore limited to potentially altering not only police behaviour
but protester behaviour as well. Despite the shift of the gaze
to the aerial perspective, the potential self-implication of
protester-operated gaze is not new, with the use of mobile
phone cameras at terrestrial level, for example, being ac-
knowledged as being “a strategic weapon at the same time
as they increase activists’ risk of being identified by authori-
ties” (Neumayer and Stald, 2013:128). Protester footage can
be transformed into a potent intelligence source for the po-
lice; indeed, Wilson and Serisier (2010:170) observe that
“[o]ne of the key ironies is that in monitoring and document-
ing protest actions video activists may inadvertently assem-
ble a database that incriminates those it is intended to pro-
tect”. This monitoring of protesters in order to enable self-
regulation can, however, be intentional with the pilot of the
Occupy Wall Street’s “occucopter”, Tim Pool, stating that
“It’s going to be monitoring everybody. If there’s a black
bloc, they’re going to get caught too. It’s going to show peo-
ple the truth, whether that’s wrongdoing by protesters, by
police, or by anybody else in the area” (Martin, 2011). It is
possible, therefore, that some protesters may also seek to de-
velop ways to resist aerial surveillance by the drones of fel-
low protesters and journalists, as well as the already existing
layers of police surveillance.
5 Counter-surveillance
The presence of protester-operated drones in the skies
also could be considered as counter-surveillance against
police surveillance. Monahan (2006:516) defines counter-
surveillance as the “intentional, tactical uses, or disruptions
of surveillance technologies to challenge institutional power
asymmetries.” Protester-operated drones, as well as challeng-
ing power relations through establishing a potential panop-
tic effect, also have the potential to neutralise the capabil-
ity of police to conduct police aerial surveillance of protests
and can therefore be viewed as a multi-faceted form of
counter-surveillance. Protester drones in the airspace above
and around protests may restrict access to other aviation as-
sets owing to concerns over collisions, as drones have done
to other emergency services in other potentially dangerous
scenarios. In California, for example, manned firefighter air-
craft, scheduled to drop water and chemicals on fires, were
grounded multiple times in July 2015 due to the presence of
drones in the airspace above and around the fires. Explaining
the grounding, Mike Eaton, a forest aviation officer, report-
edly commented that if a drone “gets into our engine or hits
our wings, there’s no doubt we are going down” (Medina,
2015). This restriction of access has led to the US Depart-
ment of the Interior and the US Forest Service pushing the
simple message, “If you fly, we can’t” (Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, 2015). As part of allowing the execution of the
democratic right to protest, British and American police are
at protests to help ensure the safety of protesters and the pub-
lic (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005). The denial of police access
to the aerial dimension of the protest may, therefore, stim-
ulate action by the police in order to re-establish their own
aerial surveillance of protests in order to ensure safety at the
protest and control.
6 Resistance
While the analogy of the “protester panopticon” is a useful
lens for exploring the instillation of self-regulation, its appli-
cation to civilian drones above protests is not without limita-
tions. As the remainder of this article highlights, the gaze of
the drone is not necessarily all-seeing or inescapable, with
current technological capabilities, such as battery life and
camera resolution, limiting both the permanence and sophis-
tication of their gaze. These technological limitations mean
that the current regulatory effects of drones may not be all-
encompassing, with Martin Stolar, a lawyer for the Occupy
Wall Street movement, for example, noting that although
the presence of protester-operated drones “might have some
kind of chilling effect on misconduct”, the poor resolution of
footage may limit the effectiveness of its use in court (Martin,
2011). Concern over the suitability and robustness of footage
in court is not limited to the aerial perspective, however, as
this also affects terrestrial cameras (Goldsmith, 2010).
The remainder of this article builds upon these limita-
tions, highlighting that protester drones do not necessar-
ily ensure power over the police. “Control is never com-
pletely hegemonic. There is always an element of resis-
tance” (Koskela, 2003:306). This resistance can come in
many forms, for as Marx (2003:372) observes, “[h]umans
are wonderfully inventive at finding ways to beat control sys-
tems and to avoid observation”. Since, as Clark (2014:299)
suggests, “[g]overnment agencies generally have an interest
in denying the public the right to apply visual surveillance
against them”, police authorities are, accordingly, not pas-
sively accepting the impact of technological advances; in-
stead they are resisting, engaging in what Wilson and Serisier
(2010:168) describe as the “move and counter-move dance
of tactical innovation engaging internal and external actors
in protests”. The neutralisation achieved by each move in
the dance can come in many forms, for as Marx (2009:296)
identifies, “[n]eutralisation may be direct or indirect.” Having
explored the establishment of a potential “protester panopti-
con”, the remainder of this article explores the ways in which
the police may attempt to resist the effects of protester drones
in the skies above them. It is important to stress that the fol-
lowing speculative police options for resistance are not nec-
essary options that the police may implement, merely repre-
senting options for police resistance that are technically or
theoretically possible.
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7 Legislative efforts
Marx (2003:374) cautions that the game of tactical innova-
tion should not, however, necessarily be considered as be-
ing between equals, noting that “the rules may not be equally
binding on all players”. Unlike protesters, the police have the
ability to utilise “significant asymmetry power” through leg-
islation and regulations in order to neutralise the gaze of the
protester drone (Wilson and Serisier, 2010:170). The British
National Police Chiefs’ Council (2015:5), for example, sug-
gests legislation that drone pilots could be found to be in
breach of, including the Air Navigation Order 2009, Pub-
lic Order Act 1998, Protection from Harassment Act 1997,
Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Terrorism Act 2000. This
list, however, is not exhaustive. Access to the aerial dimen-
sion can also be denied through the relevant regulatory body,
with the CAA in the UK or FAA in the USA, able to install
no-fly zones over specific areas. Following the outbreak of
protests and demonstrations in Ferguson in the USA after the
shooting of an unarmed black teenager, for example, a no-fly
zone of more than 37 square miles was erected and kept in
place for 12 days, reportedly to keep media helicopters from
covering the protests (Gillum and Lowy, 2014). This de-
nial of the aerial perspective echoes police efforts at ground
level of protests to restrict access, with the media prevented
from filming the eviction of Occupy protesters from Zuccotti
Park in lower Manhattan in 2011, for example (Sharkey and
Knuckey, 2011).
On a terrestrial level, Wilson and Serisier (2010) observe
that the police regularly utilise a range of legislation to
counter and prevent use of recording technology at protests.
The ability of cameras to takes to the skies, due to their
mounting on drones, does not change the fact that they are
cameras and are therefore covered by existing legislation
(Cremin et al., 2014). One such piece of legislation which
has been used previously to attempt to stop the photography
and recording of police in the UK is the Terrorism Act 2000,
an amendment of which, Section 58(a), makes it illegal to
photograph or record police if the images are likely to be use-
ful to a terrorist (Terrorism Act 2000, Lewis, 2009). Due to
attempted uses of this act to prevent photography of officers,
the Metropolitan Police have issued clarification, stressing
that “[m]embers of the public and the media do not need a
permit to film or photograph in public places and police have
no power to stop them filming or photographing incidents or
police personnel” (Metropolitan Police, 2015).
Alongside legislation affecting cameras there exists a raft
of regulations that specifically applies to operating drones,
although the legal and regulatory framework surrounding the
civilian use of drones varies from country to country and
is evolving over time, with regulators attempting a balanc-
ing act between safety and privacy concerns and stifling an
emerging industry (Cremin, Goodwill et al., 2015). Despite
the legislative and regulatory differences between countries,
there are also similarities, with both the Civil Aviation Au-
thority (2016) in the UK and the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (2016a) in the United States forbidding the flying of
hobbyist drones over 400 feet or over crowds of people, for
example. Despite the existence of regulations, however, there
have been numerous examples of violations, with the Federal
Aviation Administration (2016b) receiving more than 100 re-
ports of violations a month. The enforcement of drone regu-
lations, however, has encountered difficulties in both Britain
and the United States, partially in identifying the pilot, even
after an incident. Chief Inspector Nick Aldworth (2014:336)
of the British Metropolitan Police, for example, highlights
that “[t]he big challenge is in the application of the legislation
and actually finding the person responsible for that offence.
When this material appears on the internet, for example, it
cannot necessarily be attributed to the pilot or the person fly-
ing the machine”. In summary, “unless we can get there and
then and identify the pilot or the person flying the machine,
subsequent intervention becomes far more challenging than
it would be otherwise”. More generally, concerns have also
been raised about the practicality of actually implementing
drone regulations, especially when judging distances in the
air and proximity (Aldworth, 2014). These difficulties may
well be compounded in an active, fast moving environment,
such as a protest.
8 Obscuring the gaze
The adoption of drones is known to have had an effect
on the subjects of surveillance. “People who are aware of
adversarial monitoring from the skies also engage in tac-
tics to evade the drone state. Specifically, subjects of drone
surveillance have tried to be stealthier and camouflage them-
selves better than they have in the past” (Wall and Monahan,
2011:247). In Cities Under Siege, Graham (2011) suggests
that the boomerang effect described by Foucault (2004:103)
in Society Must Be Defended, the transferal of mechanisms
of power from colonies back to the West, is clearly visible in
the way in which drones originally designed for overseas mil-
itary use are being adopted for use in the West; indeed, “Is-
raeli drones designed to vertically subjugate and target Pales-
tinians are now routinely deployed by police forces in North
America, Europe and East Asia” (Graham, 2011:xviii). This
article proposes that not only have drones, as a mechanism of
power, returned from the battlespace and been appropriated
by protesters in order to watch the apparatus of the state, as
visible from online protester drone footage from protests in
Bangkok and Kiev to New York and Warsaw (Noack, 2014),
but also it is possible that attempts to resist the gaze of the
drone may eventually follow drones from home from the bat-
tlefield.
Insights into potential police effort to avoid identifica-
tion by drones can be drawn from previous police efforts on
the terrestrial plain and efforts to resist traditional sousveil-
lance tools, such as cameras. In order to obstruct success-
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ful identification of officers by protesters with cameras, there
have been multiple cases of police removing, or covering,
their identification numbers, a practice referred to by Marx
(2003:379) as a “blocking move”, thereby hindering a central
tenet of the panoptic gaze: the identification and illumination
of the individual so they can be held accountable for any po-
tential action. These efforts by police officers to obstruct or
mask their identification and evade being held to account for
their actions has led to criticism from the IPCC (Bingham,
2009; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). As the sophistication
of drone cameras increases over time, potentially being able
to capture and record the identification numbers of police at a
distance, the IPCC may find themselves investigating similar
attempts to obscure the aerial gaze of the drone.
Even if individual members of the police remove their
identification numbers and manage to defeat the identifying
ability of the protester drone, the police may find it harder to
hide the more general movements of officers. The aerial per-
spective of the drone may allow the relaying of police move-
ments and operations through social media and smartphone
applications such as the anti-kettling app Sukey, allowing
protesters to escape police efforts to restrict their movements
(O’Rourke, 2011). In order to resist the gaze of protester
drone and counter this loss of operation secrecy, the police
may have to alter their tactics and attempt to engage in mis-
direction, potentially utilising tactics from the battlefield.
9 Electronic countermeasures
Alongside utilising legislation to resist the gaze of the drone
there are also more technical solutions to mitigate the pres-
ence of drones above police, utilising the other dimension of
the protester volume: the electronic and radio spectrum. One
potential solution to drones is a technique known as geofenc-
ing, whereby, simply put, a drone “can have geographical in-
formation stored in its GPS navigation system to prevent it
from flying in selected areas” (The British Airline Pilots As-
sociation (BALPA), 2014:105). Geofences can be created in
a short period of time. For example, days after a DJI Phantom
drone was crashed into the lawn of the White House in Wash-
ington, DC, the drone manufacturer DJI issued a software
update that established a geofence around downtown Wash-
ington, DC, preventing the operation of any of their drones
in the area (Bi, 2015). This mandatory software update does,
however, highlight one of the limits of the current status of
geofencing: the software is not universal in all commercially
bought drones, nor is it necessary to include it on home con-
structed versions.
It has been shown to be technologically possible to elec-
tronically interfere with, and neutralise, drones. The same
week that Amazon announced intentions to use drones to
deliver packages, for example, plans were posted online on
how to hack Parrot AR drones (Kellon, 2013). It is, how-
ever, unnecessary to seize direct control of a drone in order
to neutralise its gaze. Many drones have a software routine
in place which allows it to return home if it loses contact
with the pilot or GPS signal. Therefore, in order for the po-
lice to remove a drone from the airspace all they need to
do is obstruct the drone’s access to signal. GPS jamming
technology already exists and is in widespread circulation.
Indeed, despite their operation being illegal, there were es-
timated to be thousands of GPS jammers in circulation in
the UK in 2013 (Arthur, 2013; Ofcom, 2015). One of the
hazards of the police using jammers in order to neutralise
protester drones from viewing and recording their actions,
however, is that jamming technology is not specific in its tar-
geting. The use of jammers would create a bubble, affect-
ing everything using GPS, potentially including police equip-
ment. A poignant caution of jamming technology comes
from Newark airport in New Jersey in 2009, when a jam-
mer on a nearby truck repetitively interfered with an airport
navigation system. While there were not any serious acci-
dents caused from the jamming, it highlights the unintended
risks of the technology (The Economist, 2011). Hacking and
jamming drones, however, are not the only options to elec-
tronically interfere with a drone. A third technique, spoofing,
involves tricking a drone autopilot into thinking that it is the
wrong position, leading the autopilot to correct the location
of the drone, moving away from its original, intended posi-
tion. In June 2012, for example, a team from the University of
Texas tricked an USD 80 000 drone into thinking it was gain-
ing altitude, resulting in it descending and nearly crashing
into the ground before the team intervened (Whitlock, 2014).
Spoofing was also the technique that Iran claimed to have
used to bring down a US RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011 (Rawns-
ley, 2011). While it is prudent to stress that not all drones
currently possess autopilots, as technology advances spoof-
ing may become an option for neutralising protester drones.
The hacking, jamming and spoofing of drones highlight the
need to approach protests as volumes with multiple different
dimensions, including electronic, so as to not overlook power
relations.
10 Kinetic and physical force
In the scenario where all other efforts have failed to neu-
tralise the gaze of the drone it is possible that physical force
may be applied towards drones or their operators. Although
police can arrest drone pilots who are deemed to be fly-
ing illegally, or dangerously, they may encounter difficul-
ties in the actual identification of the pilot and the execu-
tion of the arrest as drone pilots do not necessarily carry or
use controllers that might render them easily visible to the
police, with smartphone apps offering the capability to dis-
creetly control drones. Even the successful identification of
protester-operated drones and their pilots, however, does not
necessarily result in the breaking of the aerial gaze. Unco-
operative or hostile protesters may restrict or hinder police
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access to said operator and upon reaching a pilot the police
may have to attempt to land the drone themselves, which may
be dangerous. Three police officers in the UK, for example,
even in a non-protest environment, struggled to safely land a
drone after arresting a photojournalist pilot in 2014 (Quinn,
2014). Uncontrolled landings could pose a risk to those on
the ground so it may well be that police likely to encounter
drones could be given basic training in order to allow them
to land drones safely.
If the pilot of the drone cannot be identified or reached,
it is possible that the drone itself might be targeted in order
to break its gaze, in what Marx (2003:381) describes as a
“breaking move”: “the crudest form of neutralisation.” De-
spite the relatively recent emergence and adoption of drone
technology by protesters, the tactic of using physical force
against more traditional forms of recording, such as cam-
eras, is well established (Wilson and Serisier, 2010). Physi-
cally targeting drones in the skies above protests, however, is
more complicated than interacting with more traditional tools
of sousveillance, such as video cameras, due to the potential
uncontrolled decent of the drone posing a risk to those on
the ground. Despite the risks to those on the ground, drones
have been filmed being shot down by police in Turkey for in-
stance (Peck, 2013). The ongoing challenge of how to phys-
ically neutralise drones is not limited to the police but faced
by militaries around the world, with various options, such as
lasers, emerging as potential solutions (Vincent, 2014). Mili-
tary counter-drone technology may, in time, return to the do-
mestic home front in the same way that we have seen the re-
turn of larger drones themselves (Wall and Monahan, 2011;
Graham, 2010). Current, less-sophisticated options for phys-
ically neutralising drones include using a drone to carry a
net in which to entangle the rotors of another drone (The
Economist, 2015). Similarly, net launchers were reportedly
taken to the 2015 Boston Marathon in order to enforce a ban
on drones at the event, but they were not employed by police
due to a lack of training (Annear, 2015). While these options
are potentially safer for people on the ground than shooting
down drones, it is important to stress that any physical in-
teraction with an airborne drone poses a risk of causing its
uncontrolled decent, which is why the NPCC (2015:8) rec-
ommend the passive reaction to drones: waiting for their bat-
teries to run out.
11 Conclusions
In order to contribute to the emerging study of civilian drone
use, this article has sought to highlight that, while the in-
creased civilian adoption of drones has the potential to in-
crease the surveillance of police at protests, this gaze is not
all encompassing or unescapable. The police can resist the
potential panoptic effect of the aerial gaze of the drone. Re-
sistance, within surveillance literature, cautions Bradshaw
(2013:452), is “seldom explored from the perspective of
those who are surveilled”. This article has, accordingly, spec-
ulatively outlined some of the ways in which the British and
American police forces may attempt to resist the contestation
of power represented by protester surveillance by drones,
ranging from legislation and misdirection to electronic and
physical responses. Not all of the options outlined may be
practical at present, and this article was meant to provide not
a complete list but a snapshot – a starting point for future in-
vestigation and to stimulate discussion. As drone technology
continues to develop, new and improved capabilities will be-
come available, inevitably leading to counter-moves and new
forms of resistance.
While this article has discussed potential options for resist-
ing the panoptic gaze of the drone, it is important to remem-
ber that drones are but one tool of a larger protester sousveil-
lance toolkit for increasing accountability amongst police,
joining a repertoire that includes video cameras, smartphones
and social media. In exploring the potential responses to this
new tool, this article has sought to supplement valuable work
on the impact of previous technologies on power relations be-
tween protesters and police, such as mobile phones (Mitchell
and Staeheli, 2005) and social media (O’Rourke, 2011),
and work on the terrestrial territorial element of protests
(Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005; Herbert, 2007).
Finally, whether they are known as drones, UAVs, RPASs
or other newly emerging terms, the technology is being in-
creasingly adopted across society, with the sector estimated
to create 150 000 jobs in Europe by 2050 (House of Lords,
2015) and 103 776 in the United States by 2025 (Jenkins
and Vasigh, 2013). This proliferation and increased utilisa-
tion of the aerial space make it essential to include the aerial
dimension into our thoughts and debates surrounding surveil-
lance, society and territory – to think volumetrically. The use
of drones to aid in this conceptualisation of a protest as a
volume, however, should not be viewed as merely adding
an aerial perspective, for the protest volume also includes a
wide range of other dimensions which need to be explored
and considered, ranging from social media and phone sig-
nals conveying police and protester movements to the elec-
tronic and radio spectrum used to control drones, which may
be open to electronic interference and interaction. This arti-
cle has only begun to scratch the surface of these additional
dimensions within the protest volume and encourages further
exploration and engagement.
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